As the world writes eulogies on western leaders' role in the fall of the Berlin Wall, facts suggest they were as apprehensive about it as the Soviets, says SAURABH KUMAR SHAHI
On the eve of the 20th year of the fall of the Berlin Wall, eulogies were penned for the western leaders of that time. As hundreds of thousands gathered to celebrate at where the Berlin Wall once stood, names of George Bush Senior, Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand were brought back into reckoning. As people profoundly thanked these leaders for demolishing the sign of “subjugation”, nobody cared and talked about what was going on in the minds of these very leaders in the days leading to the ‘Fall’.
Interesting documents, in possession of National Security Archive based in Washington D.C., reflect the profound apprehensions and uneasiness which engulfed the capitals on both sides of the Mediterranean and beyond, on the days leading to the fall. The discomfort, in many cases, was to the point of outright opposition to the possibility of German unification. The documents, mostly minutes of the meetings, drawn from the archives of Soviet, American and European secret files conclude that perhaps all those eulogies were too farfetched. After all, George Bush Senior, Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand did not help in bringing down the Wall. In fact, far from it, they had actually liked the status quo and did not want turbulence in Europe.
For example, what Polish Solidarity hero Lech Walesa told the then West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the morning of the fall was, “Events in the GDR are developing too quickly” and “at the wrong time.” He was sceptical and fearful that the Wall might fall in a few weeks. He was so apprehensive that he even advised Kohl that “one must try to slow them down”. It actually fell that night only. He was fearful that if it happened, Helmut Kohl will shift his priorities to GDR. He’ll also ask the West to divert all the aid to the GDR region and thus, an apprehensive Walesa thought Poland will be left “in the background.” As if fate was taking dictation from Walesa, Kohl indeed abruptly terminated his Poland visit and flew back to Germany the same night to deal with the evolving situation.
Another interesting discussion is the one between British Iron Lady and conservative ideologue, the then Prime Minister of UK, Margaret Thatcher, and the then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. It took place on September 3, the same year. As Thatcher was aware that her views on German unification were radical and opposite of what the West propagated, she engaged in an off-the-record conversation. However, Gorbachev’s aide Anatoly Chernyaev rushed out of the room immediately after the conversation and jotted them down. Thatcher had said that “Britain and western Europe are not interested in the unification of Germany. The words written in the NATO communiqué may sound different but disregard them.” She also tried to influence Gorbachev by saying that the US too was not very different in its thought. She wanted him to believe her at any cost. “We are not interested in the destabilisation of eastern Europe or the dissolution of the Warsaw treaty either ... I can tell you that this is also the position of the US president,” the Iron Lady had added. A perplexed Chernyaev drew the conclusion that Thatcher wanted to foil German unification “with our hands” and not hers.
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Source : IIPM Editorial, 2009
On the eve of the 20th year of the fall of the Berlin Wall, eulogies were penned for the western leaders of that time. As hundreds of thousands gathered to celebrate at where the Berlin Wall once stood, names of George Bush Senior, Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand were brought back into reckoning. As people profoundly thanked these leaders for demolishing the sign of “subjugation”, nobody cared and talked about what was going on in the minds of these very leaders in the days leading to the ‘Fall’.
Interesting documents, in possession of National Security Archive based in Washington D.C., reflect the profound apprehensions and uneasiness which engulfed the capitals on both sides of the Mediterranean and beyond, on the days leading to the fall. The discomfort, in many cases, was to the point of outright opposition to the possibility of German unification. The documents, mostly minutes of the meetings, drawn from the archives of Soviet, American and European secret files conclude that perhaps all those eulogies were too farfetched. After all, George Bush Senior, Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand did not help in bringing down the Wall. In fact, far from it, they had actually liked the status quo and did not want turbulence in Europe.
For example, what Polish Solidarity hero Lech Walesa told the then West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the morning of the fall was, “Events in the GDR are developing too quickly” and “at the wrong time.” He was sceptical and fearful that the Wall might fall in a few weeks. He was so apprehensive that he even advised Kohl that “one must try to slow them down”. It actually fell that night only. He was fearful that if it happened, Helmut Kohl will shift his priorities to GDR. He’ll also ask the West to divert all the aid to the GDR region and thus, an apprehensive Walesa thought Poland will be left “in the background.” As if fate was taking dictation from Walesa, Kohl indeed abruptly terminated his Poland visit and flew back to Germany the same night to deal with the evolving situation.
Another interesting discussion is the one between British Iron Lady and conservative ideologue, the then Prime Minister of UK, Margaret Thatcher, and the then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. It took place on September 3, the same year. As Thatcher was aware that her views on German unification were radical and opposite of what the West propagated, she engaged in an off-the-record conversation. However, Gorbachev’s aide Anatoly Chernyaev rushed out of the room immediately after the conversation and jotted them down. Thatcher had said that “Britain and western Europe are not interested in the unification of Germany. The words written in the NATO communiqué may sound different but disregard them.” She also tried to influence Gorbachev by saying that the US too was not very different in its thought. She wanted him to believe her at any cost. “We are not interested in the destabilisation of eastern Europe or the dissolution of the Warsaw treaty either ... I can tell you that this is also the position of the US president,” the Iron Lady had added. A perplexed Chernyaev drew the conclusion that Thatcher wanted to foil German unification “with our hands” and not hers.
For Complete IIPM Article, Click on IIPM Article
Source : IIPM Editorial, 2009
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